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Introduction
In this article I wish to consider the question of rendering Buddhist terminology in modern languages with reference 
to several terms appearing in the Vyākhyāyukti. The background to this question is as follows. In Japan, it is difficult 
for people today to gain an understanding of Buddhism through the medium of traditional Sino-Japanese terms. In 
addition, we have reached the stage where Buddhist researchers have themselves been reflecting on the fact that it 
may not be possible for them to formulate their arguments without engaging in the task of clearly defining technical 
terms in their own words and rendering them in modern Japanese.1 Further, in terms of multicultural harmonious co-
existence too language is pivotal to thought and philosophy, and a clear presentation and understanding of the 
meaning of words is essential for building a common basis for people with differing cultural and philosophical 
backgrounds. In particular, brahmacarya, one of the terms taken up below, has its origins in Brahmanism but was 
later adopted by Buddhism and given a distinctive meaning, which is interesting also from the perspective of 
multicultural exchange. In the following I wish to take up chapter 2 of the Vyākhyāyukti from the above point of view 
and present modern equivalents of several important terms appearing in this chapter.
 First, it needs to be understood that the definition and understanding of a particular term differs between 
different schools of thought, between people belonging to the same school, between works written by the same 
person, and also between different contexts in the same work. When considered in this light, an effective method is 
to take up a particular work, presenting passages of some length, and examine possible equivalents on the basis of 
the context and usage found in these passages. In chapter 2 of the Vyākhyāyukti 103 sūtra passages have been taken 
from āgamas and interpretations are given for terms appearing in these passages.2 As regards the arrangement of the 
103 sūtra passages, passages 1–8 deal with extolment of the Three Jewels of Buddha, Dharma, and Saṅgha, while 
passages 9–31 deal with defilement. Among the latter, one’s attention is drawn in particular to the terms brahmacarya 
(“conduct for purity”), paramārtha (“[the] ultimate”), and kāma (“desire”). While there is no need to present all of 
the sūtra passages concerning defilement and the accompanying interpretations, annotated translations of sūtra 
passages 9, 14, 17–22 and 30 have been appended to this article as reference material since they have bearings on the 
following discussion.3
1. Brahmacarya
Brahmacarya is a concept going back to Brahmanism. An illustrative passage showing its usage by Vasubandhu is 
found in chapter 1 of the Vyākhyāyukti, and this definition has also been used in the sGra sbyor bam po gnyis pa.
Articles
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 Conduct for purity (brahmacarya) is the path to nirvāṇa. Nirvāṇa is pure in the sense that it is most important, 
for it is said that “it is quiescent (śānta), has become cool (śītī bhūta), and has become pure (brahmībhūta).” 
That which causes one to practise, to go to, to obtain that (i.e., purity)—that is conduct for purity, as in the 
case of liquor (*madya) by which one becomes intoxicated (*√mad).4
 As well as being defined in this way, brahmacarya is also used in the different sense of “celibacy,” a usage that 
predates Buddhism.5 This usage occurs in the interpretation of the first sūtra passage among the series of sūtra 
passages dealing with defilement.
 In sūtra passage 9 (see Reference Material) there occur the phrases “[any monk who…] (6) blows a conch shell, 
(7) claims to be a śramaṇa when he is not a śramaṇa, and (8) claims to be acting for purity when he is not acting for 
purity,” and Vasubandhu comments as follows:
 That (= (6)) is again due to two kinds of causes: (i) because he claims śramaṇa-hood in an ultimate sense on 
account of desiring evil (= (7)), or (ii) because he claims to abstain from coitus (*maithuna) (= (8)).
The correspondences with the phrases in the sūtra passage are based on Guṇamati’s commentary, and according to 
this explanation brahmacarya means to abstain from sexual intercourse.
 Brahmacarya is also mentioned in the treatment of the five mental obscurations or obstacles in sūtra passage 14 
(see Reference Material), where it is stated that the first obscuration of passion is an obstacle to morality (śīla) on 
account of which one deviates from brahmacarya. The five obscurations are also mentioned in verse 59 of the 
“Anuśaya-nirdeśa” in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya, with several interpretations being given, and in his commentary 
on an alternative view Vasubandhu presents the interpretation that, with regard to lust and anger, when a monk 
begging for alms perceives an agreeable or disagreeable object and considers it as such, there arises either passion or 
anger.6 According to Yaśomitra’s commentary, it means to perceive something as the form of a woman (strī) or as the 
voice of a woman.7 Judging from the above, it would seem that “lust” is being interpreted from the perspective of 
lust for a woman (or a member of the opposite sex). “Lust” (kāmarāga) refers to “passion” (rāga) in the realm of 
desire (kāmadhātu), and according to the Dharmaskandha *rāga means “to engender pleasure and delight in objects 
of desire,”8 while in Interpretation III of sūtra passage 17 it is stated that the objects of desire are, in short, the desire 
for food and sexual desire.9 In light of the above, brahmacarya here refers not to the noble eightfold paths (the 
eightfold path of the noble ones) but to celibacy.
 That the term brahmacarya has the above two meanings has until now been understood either through 
experience or by induction. Murakami and Oikawa (1999, s.v. brahmacariya) write: “It originally signified the 
abstinent novitiate’s life of a Brahmin youth living in his teacher’s home and studying the Vedas, but in Buddhism it 
refers to a renunciant’s religious life, pure conduct, chaste conduct, and life removed from sexual intercourse.” 
Likewise, in the Iwanami Dictionary of Buddhism (Iwanami Bukkyō jiten 岩波仏教辞典, 2nd ed., s.v. bongyō 梵行) 
it says: “<*bon 梵> (brahman) means temperance or abstinence, and <*gyō 行> (caryā) refers to conduct or act. Pure 
conduct. I.e., a renunciant’s observing of the precepts and leading a life of abstinence. In particular, refraining from 
all sexual acts.… Came to refer to the Buddhist life of practice per se.”
 Meanwhile, the fact that Vasubandhu and Guṇamati give these two meanings of brahmacarya deductively and 
by definition can be seen in their comments on sūtra passage 58. The following quotation corresponds to the tenth 
benefit among the ten benefits of the establishment of the precepts as described in the sūtra passage together with 
Vasubandhu’s interpretation.
 “It is (10-a) in order to foster conduct for purity (brahmacarya) and (10-b) in order to make conduct for 
purity last for a long time. (10-c) ‘May my (i.e., the Buddha’s) conduct for purity last for a long time!’10” It is 
to engage in (10-a') conventional [conduct for purity] and (10-b') ultimate conduct for purity, and it is (10-c') 
the twosome of [the transmission of] renunciation and the transmission of realization.11 12
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 Guṇamati first states that “‘conventional (*sāṃketika ≒ secular) conduct for purity’ is to refrain from the 
practice of coitus.13 ‘Conventional’ means ‘conventional’ (*vyavahārika).”14 He then goes on to show clearly that 
brahmacarya in an ultimate sense refers to the noble eightfold paths.
 In the context of the Vyākhyāyukti, however, the principal meaning of brahmacarya is the noble eightfold paths.
Sūtra 8015
 “(8) In order to foster conduct for purity (*brahmacaryānugrahāya)” is in order to complete the noble path 
by preserving the body and by means of the body’s strength and the body’s absence of defilement,16 for it says 
in other sūtras, “What is conduct for purity? It is the noble eightfold paths.”17
Sūtra 96
 “(2) Trouble for conduct for purity”18 means that if one craves for either acquisition or respect, one does not 
desire the eightfold path to nirvāṇa for noble ones, and this was taught by the Blessed One to be “trouble for 
conduct for purity.”19
Summary
I now wish to summarize the meaning of brahmacarya in the context of the above observations. According to the 
Vyākhyāyukti, there is conventional brahmacarya and brahmacarya in an ultimate sense, and they signify celibacy 
and the noble eightfold paths respectively. There is probably a need to indicate which meaning is intended in each 
case. Were one to essay a modern rendering when doing so rather than making do with the Sino-Japanese fanxing (Jp. 
bongyō) 梵行, would it be preferable to use an equivalent covering both meanings? “Pure conduct,” which has been 
used in the past, may be suitable, but if one takes into account the interpretation of this compound given in chapter 1 
of the Vyākhyāyukti, according to which brahmacarya is conduct aimed at what is pure or that which causes one to 
go towards what is pure, which is here equated with nirvāṇa and is given alongside quiescence and coolness, then 
perhaps it could be translated as “conduct for purity.” Of course, it needs to be borne in mind that “purity” means 
sexual chastity and purity of mental afflictions.
2. Three meanings of paramārtha
Next, I wish to examine the term paramārtha, which has already figured in the previous section. As is well known, 
three interpretations of the compound parama-artha are given in the Madhyāntavibhāga III.11ab and commentaries 
on this verse.20
 1. artha: object of ultimate [knowledge] (G. Tatpuruṣa) = object of nondiscriminating knowledge = thusness
 2. prāpti: ultimate aim (Karmadhāraya) = nirvāṇa
 3. pratipatti: that which has the ultimate aim (Bahuvrīhi) = path
 As for the interpretation of this compound in the Vyākhyāyukti, first in connection with the first meaning, as has 
been previously pointed out, we find in chapter 4:
 “Ultimate” (*parama) is supramundane knowledge, and because it is its object (*artha), it is the ultimate 
object (*paramārtha). The own (i.e., specific) characteristics of both (karman and vipāka) are not its object, 
for its object is the general characteristic of ineffability (*nirabhilāpya/anabhilāpya-sāmānyalakṣaṇa).21
A similar definition is also given in chapter 3 of the Vyākhyāyukti:
 Supramundane knowledge is “ultimate.” Because it is its object, it is the “ultimate object,” and it is that 
which is its objective sphere (*viṣaya).22
Meanwhile, “brahmacarya in an ultimate sense” found in sūtra passage 58 quoted earlier could possibly correspond 
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to the third of the above three meanings if one takes into account the fact that the goal of the noble eightfold paths is 
nirvāṇa. Or perhaps it does not fall under any of these three meanings. For example, “śramaṇa-hood in an ultimate 
sense” in sūtra passage 9 corresponds to the uncontaminated (anāsrava) path and, according to Guṇamati, the noble 
eightfold paths, and if one possesses this, then one becomes a śramaṇa, in which case it could perhaps be translated 
as “śramaṇa-hood in a true sense.” Further in sūtra passage 30 (see Reference Material) we even find the phrase 
“ultimate (paramārtha) [impermanence].” In this case, “impermanence in an instant” is said to be “ultimate” because 
it lies at the root of “impermanence of the continuum” and “impermanence of change.”
Summary
If we take into account the above-mentioned three meanings of paramārtha and also try to bring out its nuances, then 
paramārtha could perhaps be translated as “(the) ultimate.”23
3. Two meanings of kāma
It is known that kāma, usually translated as “desire,” can signify either an object of desire or desire itself, and in Pāli 
these two meanings are differentiated as vatthukāma and kilesakāma respectively.24 In Chinese they were rendered by 
Xuanzang 玄奘, for example, as shiyu 事欲 and fannaoyu 煩惱欲.25 These correspond to desire as a thing, or 
objective kāma, i.e., an object of desire, and desire as a mental affliction, or subjective kāma, i.e., desire itself.
 In this regard Vasubandhu provides an interesting interpretation of part of sūtra passage 18.
 “(1) With desire (*kāma) as the cause, (2) with desire (*kāma) as the source, (3) with the object of desire 
(*kāma) as the subject, and (4) with the very objects of desire (*kāma) as the cause […].”
This is part of the sūtra passage, and it explains the reasons that people quarrel with one another.
 The original Sanskrit term common to all four phrases is surmised to be the single term kāma. In interpreting 
these phrases, Vasubandhu employs the above-mentioned framework of kilesakāma (kleśakāma) and vatthukāma 
(vastukāma) and, further differentiating between that which has been obtained and that which has not been obtained, 
explains the above passage in the following way: “(1) with a wish (*chanda) for an object that has not been obtained 
as the cause, (2) with passion (*rāga) for an object that has been obtained as the source, (3) with an object of desire 
that has not been obtained as the subject, and (4) for the sake of objects of desire that have been obtained.” Not only 
is it evident that translating kāma uniformly as “desire” would be problematic insofar that Vasubandhu divides kāma 
into two kinds, but it is also intriguing to see how in his interpretation of the sūtra passage he discovers meaning and 
significance in individual words that would seem to be merely repetitious. According to Vasubandhu, that above 
phrases explain “by what cause and for what reason [people] quarrel.”
 In sūtra passages 17 (see Reference Material) and 85 kāma is, according to Guṇamati, used in the second sense. 
As well, in for example sūtra passages 68 and 80 kāma is not defined. Further, there are instances in which kāma 
refers to the realm of desire (kāmadhātu) among the three realms.
[Sūtra 85] (opening section)
 “One (1) does not accept, (2) renounces, (3) eliminates, and (4) ends discursive thinking about objects of 
desire26 that has arisen.”27
The above is a sūtra passage.
[Sūtra 68] (in Interpretation V)
 The self is not a refuge, [for]28 it is dependent on objects of desire.29
[Sūtra 87] (opening section)
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 “He practises (1) in order to become disenchanted with, (2) in order to become dispassionate towards, and (3) 
in order to extinguish desires (*kāma).”30
The above is a sūtra passage.
[Interpretation I]
“Desires” is the realm of desire (*kāmadhātu). “Forms” is the realm of form.
Summary
The traditional Sino-Japanese translation of kāma is yu (Jp. yoku) 欲 (“desire”), but it needs to be translated as either 
“object of desire” or “desire” depending on the context. However, the question of how far to apply this to sūtra 
passages from āgamas is a separate issue.
 As in the previous case of brahmacarya, in this case of kāma too it could perhaps be considered that a term 
originating in Brahmanism (which was for Śākyamuni general usage in the world at large) was modified by 
Buddhism. It is well known that the Udānavarga includes the following words: “Various things in the world are not 
kāmā (pl.); kāma (sg.) is human thought and passion.”31 This could be understood on the basis of the earlier contrast 
between vatthukāma and kilesakāma as meaning that in general usage the objects of desire are kāma, but in a more 
fundamental (or ultimate!) sense desire itself is kāma. There is not sufficient space to examine the origins of these 
two terms here, but in the “Cintāmayībhūmi” of the Yogācārabhūmi cited in n. 25 it is stated that the severance of 
vastukāma means that while someone may have gained faith in Buddhism and, seeing that the life of a layman entails 
suffering, may have left home to become a renunciant, he has still not been long free from lust (*kāmarāga: passion 
in the realm of desire), whereas the severance of kleśakāma refers to the next stage in which he practises in order to 
completely sever lust and succeeds in doing so.32 Taking this into account, it could be said that in the above verse 
from the Udānavarga the general usage of kāma has been modified and transformed so as to bring it in line with the 
Buddhist teaching of eradicating mental afflictions themselves, and it can also be understood in terms of the 
framework of the conventional and the ultimate.
4. Terms that cannot be translated without taking into account the Buddhist worldview
For instance, the interpretation of “practice related to merit,” “practice related to goodness,” and “practice related to 
excellence” in sūtra passage 21 (see Reference Material) is premised on the theory of the three realms, and it is 
pointless to simply convert puṇya-karman and āneñjya/āniñjya-karman into their modern equivalents. It is necessary 
to present the distinctive worldview on which they are premised, and one needs to provide notes of some substance 
and seek the reader’s understanding of the terms in question in the context of the system of thought as a whole.
5. Examples that must be interpreted figuratively even if there exist illustrative sentences
In sūtra passage 22 (see Reference Material) it is stated that the object of human desire is itself the ocean. This is a 
purely figurative usage and not an illustrative sentence of the usage of the word “ocean.” As in the cases of 
brahmacarya and kāma, it takes the familiar concept of “ocean,” modifies it while taking account of general usage, 
and skilfully leads the audience to the topic of the annihilation of mental afflictions.
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Concluding Remarks
In the above I selected the three terms brahmacarya, paramārtha, and kāma from among sūtra passages 9–31, 
dealing with the subject of mental afflictions, in chapter 2 of the Vyākhyāyukti, in which Vasubandhu provides 
interpretations of terms appearing in sūtra passages from āgamas, and I examined their meaning and provided 
tentative modern equivalents. The reason that these three terms were selected is that they happened to attract my 
attention within the confines of sūtra passages 9–31, but in the event brahmacarya and kāma both turned out to have 
two meanings that can, moreover, be understood in a correlated manner; that is, they can both be interpreted within 
the framework of the conventional and the ultimate. In addition, I also pointed out that when providing modern 
equivalents it should be noted that there are instances when the mere provision of a modern equivalent without 
presenting the associated worldview does not assist the reader’s understanding of the term’s meaning and that there 
are “illustrative sentences” that require the interpreter to make certain choices.
Abbreveations
D:  Sde dge edition of Tibetan Tripiṭaka.
Lee:  See Lee 2001.
P:  Peking edition of Tibetan Tripiṭaka.
Sūśa:  Sūtrakhaṇḍaśata = Vyākhyāyukti-sūtrakhaṇḍaśata (rNam par bshad pa’i rigs pa’i mdo sde’i dum bu brgya). D No. 4060 
(Śi), P No. 5561 (Si).
T:  Taishō shinshū daizōkyō 大正新脩大蔵経.
VyY:  Vasubandhu, Vyākhyāyukti. D No. 4061 (Śi), P No. 5562 (Si); cf. Lee 2001.
VyYT:  Guṇamati, Vyākhyāyukti-ṭīkā. D No. 4069 (Si), P No. 5570 (I).
(For other abbreviations and bibliography, reference should be made to Horiuchi 2009)
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2 There is also a text called Sūtrakhaṇḍaśata which presents the sūtra passages with their surrounding context along with other 
sūtra passages of which Vasubandhu quotes only parts when interpreting the sūtra passage in question (see, e.g., Sūtra 9). An 
appropriate interpretation of the character of this work was provided for the first time by Ueno (2012b).
3 I received a Grant-in-Aid for Young Scientists (B) in 2010–12 and undertook an annotated translation of chapter 2 of the 
Vyākhyāyukti. While it would be desirable to present a complete annotated translation together with an index, in the present 
article I have presented a partial translation so as to meet part of my obligation to report on the results of my research.
4 Vyākhyāyukti, chap. 1 (Yamaguchi 1973: 159; AKBh, 371.2–3; Honjō 1989: 45; Ishikawa 1993: 54; Lee 2001: 2; Honjō 
2014: 6055): tshangs par spyod pa ni mnya ngan las ’das pa’i lam yin no// mya ngan las ’das pa ni mchog tu gtso bo yin pa’i 
don gyis tshangs pa yin te/ zhi ba dang bsil bar gyur pa dang tshangs par gyur pa zhes gsungs pa’i phyir ro// der gang gis 
spyod par byed ba dang/ ’gro bar byed pa dang/ thob par byed pa de ni tshangs par spyod pa yin te/ ’dis myos par ’gyur bas 
chang zhes bya ba bzhin no//.
5 Many examples of the use of brahmacarya in the Upaniṣads and Nikāyas have been collected by Kōda (1967). Sakurabe 
(1997: 11) writes that in the context of Early Buddhist scriptures, “brahmacarya is a representative term expressive of 
Buddhist practice, but the same word was also used from early times especially in the sense of ‘not engaging in sexual acts’ 




9 Similar observations can be seen in Schopenhauer (“Nachträge zur Lehre von der Nichtigkeit des Daseyns” in Arthur 
Schopenhauer, Sämtliche Werke, hg. v. Arthur Hübscher, 7 Bde, Wiesbaden, 3. Aufl. 1972). He viewed the appetite for food 
and sex as a “spring device” that caused complex and ceaseless movement in the world of animals and humans, and he also 
considered “boredom” to provide some assistance in this.
10 Cf. Mvy, 8356: brahmacaryaṃ ca me cirasthitikaṃ bhaviṣyati.
11 VyYT: rab tu byung ba brgyud pa dang/ rtogs (P: rtog) pa brgyud pas so//
 I am indebted to Dr. Tomebechi Tōru 苫米地等流 for his assistance in interpreting this section. Initially I had inadvertently 
overlooked the correspondences involving (a) – (c), and as well as pointing these out, Dr. Tomebechi also noted that brgyud 
pa means “continuation” rather than “race” (since it is an interpretation of cirasthitikaṃ), that rab tu byung ba signifies the 
act of becoming a renunciant rather than a renunciant per se and corresponds to “conventional” brahmacarya, and that the 
reading rtogs pa is preferable to rtog pa and means “realization,” which corresponds to “ultimate” brahmacarya. I wish to 
express my gratitude to Dr. Tomebechi for his suggestions, which I have accepted in their entirety. One is also reminded of 
the statement in the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya that the Dharma has āgama (canonical teaching) and adhigama (realization ≒ 
enlightenment) as its essence (AKBh, 459.9 [AKK, VII.39ab]: saddharmo dvividhaḥ śāstuḥ āgamādhigamātmakaḥ// “The 
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right Dharma of the teacher (Śākyamuni) is of two kinds, having canonical teachings and realization as its essence”; this is 
also touched on in Interpretation II in sūtra passage 68). That the act of renunciation (and therefore also renunciants or the 
Saṅgha) and realization are transmitted means that the Buddhist order and the Buddhist teachings conveyed by the order are 
transmitted, and this would seem to accord with the present context.
12 (10) tshangs par spyod pa rjes su gzung (P: bzung) ba’i phyir dang/ tshangs par spyod pa yun ring du gnas par bya ba’i 
phyir te/ nga’i tshangs par spyod pa yun ring du gnas par ’gyur ba ni tshangs par spyod pa brda can dang don dam pa’i rjes 
su ’jug pa ste/ rab tu byung ba dang rtogs (D: rtog) pa (cf. VyY PD: par) brgyud pa gnyis so.
13 *maithunadharma. In this case it is best to specify the meaning of dharma, in the manner of Murakami and Oikawa (2009, 
s.v. methunadhamma), who define it as “the dhamma (custom, practice) of sexual congress.”
14 de la tshangs par spyod pa brda can ni ’khrig pa’i chos las ldog pa’o// brda can ni tha snyad can zhes bya ba’i tha tshig ste/
15 This sūtra passage concerns the fact that the kulaputra Nanda knew the proper amount of food to eat. See Ueno 2012b for the 
relevant sources.
16 According to Guṇamati, it is in order to dispel the suffering of wanting food.
17 E.g., SĀ 796, SN 45.39–40 (V.26): katamañ ca kho bhikkhave brahmacariyaṃ/ ayam eva ariyo aṭṭhaṅgiko maggo/
18 MĀ 191; MN 122, Mahāsuññatasutta (III.117): (2) upadduto brahmacārī brahmacārūpaddavena.
19 tshangs par spyod pa’i ’dam ni rned pa dang bkur sti gang la chags na ’phags pa’i mya ngan las ’das pa’i lam yan lag 
brgyad par mi ’dod pa ste/ …
20 For a succinct summary, see Saitō 1999.
21 Matsuda 1985; Horiuchi 2009: 331.
22 Yamaguchi 1993; Matsuda 1985; Horiuchi 2009: 141, n. 95; Lee 2001: 192: brjod pa ni kun rdzob yin pas des khong du chud 
par bya ba’i bden pa ni kun rdzob kyi bden pa yin te/ gang la brjod par ’jug pa ste/ … ’jig rten las ’das pa’i ye shes dam pa 
yin no// de’i don yin pas don dam pa ste/ de’i yul gang yin pa’o//
23 PTSD, s.v. Parama: “the highest good, ideal; truth in the ultimate sense, philosophical truth.”
24 PTSD, s.v. Vatthu: “Here belongs the defn of kāma as twofold: vatthu-kāma and kilesa-kāma, or desire for realities, objective 
kāma, and desire as property of stained character, i. e. subjective kāma.”
25 Yogācārabhūmi, “Cintāmayībhūmi” (T.30.370a20).
26 ’dod pa la rnam par rtog pa, *kāmavitarka: According to Guṇamati, *kāma refers to form, sound, smell, taste, and tangibles, 
i.e., the objects of the five sense organs, while *kāmavitarka means “to form thoughts that have that (i.e., the five sense 
objects) as their object of cognition.”
27 ’dod pa la rnam par rtog pa ’byung ba dang du mi len cing/ spong bar byed la/ sel bar byed cing byang bar byed do// gnod 
sems la rnam par rtog pa byung ba dang/ rnam par ’tshe ba (D232b1) la rnam par rtog pa ’byung ba dang du (P: dus) mi len 
cing/ spong bar byed la/ sel bar byed cing byang bar byed do.
 Āgama Parallels
 AN 4.114, Nāga (II.117.25–28); no Chinese parallels. Cf. SWTF, s.v. kāmavitarka. See also the sūtra quoted by Guṇamati 
under Sūtra 9.
 Related Texts
 This passage is also used several times in the Śrāvakabhūmi. ŚrBh II, 102.4: (1) nādhivāsayati (2) prajahāti (3) vinodayati (4) 
vyantīkaroti. In addition, SBhV, III.5 gives kāma-vitarka, vyāpāda-v., and vihiṃsā-v. as trayaḥ akuśalavitarka.
28 This means “so long as” the self is dependent on objects of desire.
29 According to Guṇamati, “form and other objects.” This presumably refers to the five objects of desire.
30 ’dod pa rnams la yid ’byung (P: byung) bar bya ba’i phyir dang/ ’dod chags dang bral bar bya ba’i phyir dang/ ’gog par 
’gyur ba’i phyir sgrub pa yin no/
 Āgama Parallels
 AN I.64.12–13 (Saññojana): so kāmānaṃ yeva nibbidāya virāgāya nirodhāya paṭipanno hoti.
 MĀ 21 (T1.448c29): 復學厭欲無欲斷欲。… (449a14) 復學色有斷貪斷業。
 Sūtra 20 also corresponds to this same sūtra.
 Related Texts
 These are stock phrases, and the same phrases are used in various sūtras in connection with disenchantment, etc., with 
saṅkhāra and paccuppanna cakkhu/viññāna too. Cf. SWTF, s.v. nirodha: NidSa, 6.17 etc.: nirvide virāgāya nirodhāya.
31 Udānavarga (F. Bernhard ed.), II.7.
32 T30.370ab.
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reference Material: 
Annotated Translation of Sūtras 9, 14, 17–22 & 30 
in Chapter 2 of VyY1
[Sūtra 9]
On those which belong to the party of defilement:
 “Any monk who (1) violates the precepts, (2) has an evil nature, (3) is rotten inside, (4) drips, (5) is defiled, 
(6) blows a conch shell, (7) claims to be a śramaṇa when he is not a śramaṇa, and (8) claims to be acting for 
purity when he is not acting for purity.”2
The above is a sūtra passage.
[Interpretation I]
“(1) Violates the precepts” because he commits3 the root sins (*maulī āpatti ≒ four pārājikas). “(2) Has an evil 
nature” because he has marred4 shamefulness and modesty (*hrī-apatrāpya).5 “(3) Is rotten inside” because he 
conceals his sin.6 “(4) Drips” because he does not renounce manifest activity (*samudācāra). “(5) Is defiled”7 
because he does not give rise to the right Dharma. “(6) Blows a conch shell”8 because he behaves like an ass,9 as is 
taught in the Ass (*Gardabha) Sūtra.10
1 VyY, D45a–, P51b–, Lee: 46ff.
2 dge slong gang (1) tshul khrims ’chal ba/ (2) sdig pa’i chos can/ (3) khong myags pa/ (4) ’dzag pa/ (5) shing rul lta bu/ (6) 
bong (P: bung) bu ltar kun tu (D: du) spyod pa/ (7) dge sbyong ma yin par dge sbyong du khas ’che ba/ (8) tshangs par spyod 
pa can ma yin par tshangs par spyod pa can du (P: tu) khas ’che ba de ni.
 Āgama Parallels
 MĀ 65 (T1.507b19); no Pāli parallel. Cf. SĀ 1174 (T2.315a5–7), SN 35.200.12, Dārukkhanda 1 (IV.180f.).
 Related Texts
 Mvy, 9136–9144 (Mvy(IF), 9073–): (1) duḥśīlaḥ, (2) pāpadharmaḥ, (3) antarpūtir, (4) avasrutaḥ, (5) kaśaṃbakajātaḥ, (6) 
śaṅkhasvarasamācaraḥ, (7) aśramaṇaḥ śramaṇapratijñaḥ, (8) abrahmacārī brahmacārīpratijñaḥ.
  Negi, s.v. lung bong ltar spyod pa, quotes the Vinayavastu, where this series of terms appears. They are explained in 
detail in the VastSg (T30.819a20–23) and ParySg (T30.770b10ff., YBh, D 'i 43b5–44a6). There are similar passages in the 
Śrāvakabhūmi (Śrāvakabhūmi Study Group 1998: 28–29, 82–83), the latter of which occurs in the context of neglecting 
one’s vows (samādānaparibhraṣṭa). Passages of similar import are also found in AKK, IV.40 and MĀ 122 (T1.611c).
3 lhag par spyod pa, *ā√pad.
4 chud gson pa, *√naś ≒ ‘to lack’...
5 According to Guṇamati, “because shamelessness is unwholesome.” In the seventy-five elements in five categories, 
shamelessness and immodesty are included among the akuśala-mahābhūmika. See Saitō et al. 2011.
6 *avadya ‘that which is blameworthy’.
7 shing rul lta bu: *kaṣ(/ś)aṃbakajāta, Pāli kasambujāto. Cf. BHSD, s.v. kaśambaka-jāta. YBh: shing rul gyis brnyogs pa’i 
chu lta bur gyur pa, 水生蝸螺. Gualuo 蝸螺 is a type of spiral shell. According to the explanation in the ParySg, this refers 
to contaminated water. That is, one cannot quench one’s thirst by drinking (≒ listening) water contaminated by spiral shells 
(≒ violation of the precepts).
8 bong bu ltar kun tu spyod pa, *śaṅkhasvarasamācara: The first half of this compound is sankassara (‘doubtful’) in Pāli, and 
as a whole it means “he who engages in doubtful conduct.” But if it is sankha, then it means “conch shell.” SĀ has “sound of 
blowing a shell” (吹貝之聲), and YBh has “sound of a conch” (螺音).
9 lung bong ltar kun tu spyod pa.
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 “<<Monks, for instance, even if an ass follows after a herd of cows and thinks, ‘I too am a cow, I too am a 
cow,’ it does not have the appearance of a cow, it does not have the fine colour (*varṇa) of a cow’s hide, and 
it does not have the voice of a cow. Monks, likewise, if a foolish person here follows after a large group 
(saṅgha) of monks and thinks, ‘I too am a monk, I too am a monk,’ he has no vast resolve (*adhimukti) at the 
proper time and does not study the learning about morality (adhiśīlaṃ śikṣā), the learning about the mind 
(adhicittaṃ śikṣā), or the learning about wisdom (adhiprajñaṃ śikṣā) at the proper time. Monks, furthermore, 
even if that foolish person follows after the large group of monks, he will however be far [removed] from the 
group of monks, and the group of monks will also be far [removed] from him.>>
 <The hooves are the same [but] it has no horns, it has four legs,> has a mouth that utters sounds, utters 
sounds, <and always goes in amongst cows, [but] this [animal = ass] is unable to utter the sound of a cow.
 Likewise, if a person here does not establish (*upa√sthā) mindfulness (*smṛti), does not abide in the 
supreme teaching of the Well-Gone One (*su gata = Buddha), is slothful, and has no respect, he will not 
touch the foothold (*pada ≒ nirvāṇa)11 of the unconditioned (*asaṃskṛta).
 Furthermore, even if that ass goes in amongst cows, it is far [removed] from the cows. Furthermore, it is 
said that even if such a person is in the Saṅgha, he is far [removed] from the assemblies of the noble 
ones.>12
—as [is stated] in the verses.
 That (= (6)) too is due to two kinds of causes: (i) because he claims śramaṇa-hood in an ultimate sense13 on 
account of desiring evil (= (7)), or (ii) because he claims to abstain from coitus (’khrig pa, *maithuna) (= (8)).14
 In brief, six faults in a monk wrongly practising the precepts have been explained:15 (I) the fault that [his] 
practice is wrong, (II) the fault that [his] thinking is wrong, (III) the fault of not being free from his misdeeds, (IV) 
the fault of consequence; (V) the fault of not having the ability of penetration,16 and (VI) the fault of wrong 
livelihood.
[Interpretation II]
Furthermore, “(3) is rotten inside” because he abides in unbearable thought [like] an insect’s egg.17 “(4) Drips” 
10 SĀ 828. Vasubandhu quotes part of the verses, while Guṇamati quotes from the first half of the prose section. As is pointed 
out by Ueno (2012b: (41), n. 5), the verses given in the SūŚa together with the passage quoted by Guṇamati (enclosed by 
double angle brackets) correspond to almost the full text of SĀ 828.
11 In chapter 1 of the Vyākhyāyukti it is pointed out that *pada has nine meanings, the first of which is nirvāṇa (Ueno 2010: 
(77)).
12 As is pointed out in Ueno 2012b, this corresponds to SĀ 828 (T.2.212b19–26).
13 don dam pa’i dge sbyong gi tshul, *paramārtha-śrāmaṇya: AKBh, 369.6ff. (ad VI.51a) has: “‘The untainted path is śramaṇa-
hood.’ The uncontaminated path is śramaṇa-hood. Indeed, by this one becomes a śramaṇa.” (śrāmaṇyam amalo mārgaḥ 
(VI.51a) anāsravo mārgaḥ śrāmaṇyam/ tena hi śramaṇo bhavati). It further says: “The ordinary person is not a śramaṇa in 
an ultimate sense because [mental afflictions] have not been completely calmed” (anatyantaśamanān na pṛthagjanaḥ 
paramārthaśramaṇaḥ). According to Guṇamati, it refers to the noble eightfold paths.
14 Guṇamati associates this with “(8) claims to be acting for purity when he is not acting for purity.”
15 Phrases (1) – (5) correspond to (I) – (V) and (6) – (8) correspond to (VI).
16 rtogs pa’i skal ba: Cf. rtogs pa’i skal ba can: prativedhanābhavyaḥ (Negi).
17 rtog pa mi bzad pa sbrang rkyang: Guṇamati quotes a passage corresponding to AN 11.18 (V.348.17ff.) (cf. MN 33, 
Gopālako) and SĀ 1249 (T2.342c; Chung 2008: 205). The words sbrang rkyag mi sel ba in the passage quoted by Guṇamati 
correspond to na āsāṭikaṃ sāṭetā in the Pāli and 不去蟲 in the Chinese translation. It is to be surmised, therefore, that sbrang 
rkyag corresponds to āśāṭikā (BHSD, s.v. āśāṭikā). In this sūtra, failure to eradicate discursive thinking about objects of 
desire (*kāmavitarka) is equated with failure to remove the eggs of an insect. See also Sūtra 85.
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because he does not conceal the wounds of the six sense organs. By means of these synonyms (viewpoints)18 six 
kinds of wrong have been explained: (I) the wrong of [his] practice, (II) the wrong of [his] thinking, (III) [the wrong 
of his] abiding, (IV) [the wrong of his] movement, (V) [the wrong of his] ability, and (VI) [the wrong of his] means 
of livelihood.
[Sūtra 14]
 “The five obscurations <that soil the mind> are <(1) the obscuration of passion, (2) the obscuration of anger, 
(3) the obscuration of torpor and sleepiness,19 (4) the obscuration of agitation and remorse,20 and (5) the 
obscuration of doubt.”21
The above is a sūtra passage.
[Interpretation I]22
The purpose of there being only five [obscurations]23 is [1] the obscurations relating to practising concentration are 
two obscurations (= (1), (2)). [2] The obscurations to entering concentration are three because [2-1] the mind is 
concentrated within (= (3)), [2-2] because it vacillates without (= (4)), and [2-3] because it is unable to attain 
certainty in application24 [to concentration] (= (5)).
[Interpretation II]25
Furthermore, the obscurations to practising calmness and insight26 are two obscurations (= (1), (2)); as for [the 
obscuration to] entering calmness, because there is the fault of dispiritedness, the obscuration to calmness is one (= 
(3)), and as for [the obscurations to] entering insight, because there are (i) [the fault of] not being completely calm 
18 This means that the interpretations of (III) and (IV) also differ.
19 Gotō (Sakamoto) 2006; Enomoto et al. 2014.
20 Saitō et al. 2011.
21 sgrib pa lnga po sems nye bar nyon mongs par byed pa dag ni (1) ’dod pa la ’dun pa’i sgrib pa dang/ (2) gnod sems dang/ 
(3) rmugs pa dang/ gnyid dang/ (4) ’gyod pa dang/ (5) the tshom gyi sgrib pa’o.
 Āgama Parallels
 SĀ 707 (T2.189c15–18), SN 46.38, Āvaraṇanīvaraṇa (V.94.17–95.4), as pointed out in Ueno 2012b.
 The five obscurations are taught in many sūtras and are the main topic of SĀ 704–710 (711). In all of these sūtras it is stated 
that one should sever the five obscurations and practise the seven factors of awakening (bodhyaṅga). In particular, the phrase 
煩惱於心 (cetaso uppakkilesā) in SĀ 707 (SN, V.94ff.) tallies with sems nyon mongs par byed pa in the VyY (although it is 
immediately followed by phrases not found in the VyY).
 Related Texts
 As is pointed out in Ueno 2012b, this sūtra is also mentioned in the VyY, I (Ueno 2013: (16)ff.), and it is also quoted in the 
AKBh and AKUP (Honjō 2014: [2022]). An interpretation of the five obscurations is given in the VastSg (T30.803c–804a, D 
196b3ff.), but it does not correspond to the āgama cited in Interpretation IV. However, a distinctive parallel can be seen in (2) 
“because one does not tolerate criticism, deprecation, instruction, and so on” (gleng ba dang/ sma dbab pa dang/ rjes su 
bstan pa la sogs pa). In addition, (3) is deemed to run counter to calmness and (4) to insight.
22 = On the practice of mental concentration [*samādhi] and entry into mental concentration.
23 According to Guṇamati, the purpose of there being only five obscurations when all mental afflictions are obscurations or 
obstacles is that these five hinder the arising of wholesome qualities.
24 yang dag par sbyor ba, saṃniyojana: AKBh, 340.9, 212.20. According to Guṇamati, “application” means to cultivate equally 
constricted (*saṃkṣipta), distracted (*vikṣipta), depressed (*līna), and other thoughts, and because of an inability to obtain 
certainty in this “application” there is “(5) the obscuration of doubt.”
25 = On calmness [*śamatha] and insight [*vipaśyanā].
26 According to Guṇamati, “calmness” is nothing other than a “special concentration,” while “insight” is a “special wisdom” 
(*prajñāviśeṣa). Guṇamati gives a similar interpretation in his comments on Sūtra 68.
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and (ii) the fault of uncertainty, the obscurations to insight are two (= (4), (5)).27
[Interpretation III]28
Furthermore, the obscurations to morality are two (= (1), (2)) because one causes broken precepts on account of 
passion and anger. The obscurations to concentration are also two (= (3), (4)) because (i) the mind is dispirited within 
and (ii) because it vacillates without. The obscuration to wisdom is one (= (5)) because one is unable to attain 
certainty.
[Interpretation IV]
In an āgama there appears:
 “The obscuration to morality is one (= (1)) because one deviates from conduct for purity (*brahmacarya). 
The obscuration to instruction (*avavāda) is also one (= (2)) because one does not accept words because of it. 
At times of calmness,29 agitation (*pragraha),30 and equanimity (*upekṣā)31 the obscurations to 
accomplishing them are three (= (3), (4), (5)).”
[Sūtra 17]
 “The objects of desire (*kāma) for people are (1) impure (*aśuci), (2) foul-smelling (*durgandha), (3) 
malodorous (*āmagandha), and (4) discordant (*pratikūla).32 <On the other hand, the objects of desire for 
gods are far superior and finer.33>”34
The above is a sūtra passage.
27 According to the YBh (T30.727b), the obstacles to calmness are (4) the obscuration of agitation and remorse, the obstacles to 
insight are (3) the obscuration of torpor and sleepiness and (5) the obscuration of doubt, and the obstacles to both are (1) the 
obscuration of passion and (2) the obscuration of anger.
28 = On morality, concentration, and wisdom.
29 Guṇamati refers to the ŚrBh (T30.456a, ŚrBh, 391.10) in connection with calmness, agitation, and equanimity, and the 
explanations of these three states in this note and the next two notes are based on this. First, “calmness” is a tranquil state of 
mind without distinguishing characteristics and without discrimination.
30 “Agitation” means to give encouragement to the mind by means of the special quality of a pure object of cognition.
31 “Equanimity” means to be disinterested in the object of cognition or not to increase exertion directed at the object of 
cognition.
32 mi mthun pa.
33 Judging from the corresponding Pāli, *abhikrāntatara and *praṇītatara? The former is recorded in SWTF in the form 
abhikrānta while the latter is given in this same form.
34 mi dag gi ’dod pa rnams ni (1) mi gtsang ba rnams dang/ (2) dri mi zhim pa rnams dang/ (3) dri nga ba rnams dang/ (4) mi 
mthun pa rnams yin no// lha dag gi ’dod pa rnams ni lhag par ches ’phags pa dang/ ches gya non pa rnams yin no.
 Āgama Parallels
 MĀ 153 (T1.671b13–14). In the corresponding Pāli (MN 75, Māgandiyasutta) only the passage on the objects of desire for 
gods (I.505.24: dibbā kāmā abhikkantatarā ca paṇītatara) tallies.
  In addition, in MĀ 71 and SĀ 1122 (T2.298aff.) this series of phrases appears not in connection with “objects of desire” 
but in connection with the five objects of desire (DN 23, SN 55.54, Gilāyanam).
  The same phrases also appear in the interpretation of Sūtra 99.
 Related Texts
 SWTF, s.v. durgandha: SHT (IV) 30 f R5: (asthisaṃ)khalikāṃ (1) aśuciṃ (2) durgandham (sic) (3) āmagandhāṃ (4) 
pratikūlāṃ (but the context differs).
  The interpretation given in the VastSg does not tally. An interpretation of the same sūtra passage appears in the ParySg 
(T30.766c), and it is close to the interpretation given in the VyY.
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[Interpretation I]
Objects of desire, which are the basis35 of coitus,36 are “(1) impure” because it is necessary to wash the body on 
account of its becoming dirty; “(2) foul-smelling” because urine and faeces37 drip [from the body]; “(3) malodorous” 
because by nature they have flesh and blood as their own nature; and “(4) discordant” because each entity too is a 
basis for nausea (skyug bro ba’i gzhi) and because discordant (*pratikūla) [feelings] arise after having engaged in 
coitus.
 If that is so, the faults of a connection of objects of desire [with smell] (= (1)), dripping (= (2)), and own nature 
(= (3), (4)) have been explained by means of [two] single phrases and two [phrases].
 In this regard it says again:
 “The objects of desire (I) are impure, are dirty and must be washed,
 (II) smell foully of urine and faeces, (III) are malodorous by their own nature,
 and (IV) are each discordant. Therefore, they are to be condemned,
 for after having engaged in coitus too discordance arises.”
[Interpretation II]
Furthermore, “(1) impurity” is of two kinds: (i) the impurity of pus38 and (ii) the impurity of mental afflictions. As 
was said (i') [about the impurity of pus]:
 “Discern how this very body is filled with various kinds of impurities.”39
(ii') As for the impurity of mental afflictions, it is as appears in:
 “Cunda, that which makes impure […].”40
 Therefore, in order to show that (i) pus is “(1) impure,” it was stated that they “(2) are foul-smelling.” In order to 
show the particularity of the foul smell, it was stated that they “(3) are malodorous.” “(4) Discordant” is as before. 
Because if they were not said to be “(1) impure,” the characteristic of “(2) foul-smelling” on account of the impurity 
of pus would not be shown. Because if they were not said to be “(2) foul-smelling,” it would not be shown that “(3) 
malodorous” is to be condemned.
[Interpretation III]
In an āgama there appears:41
 “‘(1) Impure’ is the teaching and the rest is the explanation. Therein, in brief, the objects of desire are of two 
35 According to Guṇamati, the “basis” is objects such as form that are counted among sentient beings, i.e., the body.
36 ’khrig pa, *maithuna: According to Guṇamati, sexual congress (gnyis kyis gnyis sprod pa, *dvayadvayasamāpatti [Mvy]).
37 Mvy, 4043–4044: gcing, mūtram; phyi sa, gūtham.
38 rnag: Mvy, 4041: pūyam.
39 Parallels are found in SĀ 1165 (T2.311a27–28) and SN 35.127, Bhāradvāja (IV.111).
40 mig chung mi gtsang bar byed pa: As is pointed out in Ueno 2012b, the corresponding sūtra is SĀ 1039 (Pāli AN 10.176 
[V.263–268] does not tally very closely). This sūtra teaches that the ten unwholesome deeds are “impure.” Since the person 
who appears in this sūtra is called Cunda (Chuntuo 淳陀), I take mig chung to be a translation of his name.
  According to Guṇamati, “all mental afflictions and secondary mental afflictions are nothing other than ‘(1) impure’. 
Among the ten unwholesome ways of action, which are taints of the mind, the seven with form (i.e., the seven kinds of 
physical and verbal action) are ‘impure’ because they are caused by the impurity of mental afflictions. The three of anger and 
so on (i.e., mental action) [are ‘impure’] by nature.”
41 According to the Tibetan translation, the entire passage as far as the final ’byung ngo (“there appears”) is a quotation from an 
āgama. However, if only the first sentence is regarded as a quotation from an āgama, then it tallies with the ParySg 
mentioned above.
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kinds: (i) food as objects of desire and (ii) coitus as objects of desire. As is stated in the *Bimbisārasūtra:42
 ‘Here some say that foods and drinks and likewise flavours and women are objects of desire.43
 <Observing these to be stains in the substratum (*upadhi ≒ five aggregates), I therefore do not delight in 
sacrifice (*yaṣṭa/iṣṭa) and offering.>’
 Therein (i') because food as objects of desire changes, they ‘(2) are foul-smelling and (3) malodorous’, for 
they are the substance (dngos po) of urine and faeces and change into the substance of the flesh and so on [of 
the body]. (ii') Because coitus as objects of desire changes, they ‘(4) are discordant’, for once they are 
dissociated from ardent desire44 discordance arises.”
[Sūtra 18]
 “(1) With desire as the cause, (2) with desire as the source, <(3) with the object of desire as the subject,45 and 
(4) with the very objects of desire as the cause, mother quarrels with child, child with mother, father with 
child, child with father, brother with sister, sister with brother, and friend with friend, not to mention people 
with people.>”46
The above is a sūtra passage.
 It should be known that mental afflictions as desire47 are of two kinds: wish and passion.48 Things as desire (i.e., 
objects of desire)49 are also of two kinds: that which has been obtained and that which has not been obtained.50 “(1) 
With desire as the cause, (2) with desire as the source” is due to the two kinds of mental afflictions as desire.51 “(3) 
42 ral pa can gyi mdo sde: According to Skilling 2000: 341, this is the Bimbisāra pratyudgamanasūtra (P No. 955, Vol. 38). 
Although this verse is not quoted in the AKBh, mention is made of the Bimbisārasūtra (AKBh, 465.20). Sources are given in 
Honjō 2014: [9013], and materials on this verse are given in Miyasaka 1983: (48)–(49).
  CPS, 27c.20 (III.344): (annāni pānāni tathā rasāṃś ca) (kām)āṃś ca strīś caiva vadanti haike/
  etāṃ (*tāvan) malān upadhau saṃprapaśyaṃs tasmān na yaṣṭe (*iṣṭe) na hu(te rat)o ’ham// (*Cf. SBhV, I.155)
  MĀ 62 (T1.497c8–9): 飲食種種味爲欲故事火。生中見如此是故不楽事。
43 The SūŚa has ’di na kha cig ’chi (*maranti), but my translation follows CPS, vadanti haike (cf. de Jong, IIJ, 18-3/4, 1978, 
reviews, 326: vadant’ ihaike), ’di na … smra. (The corresponding Chinese translation quoted in the previous note has “serve 
fire” [事火], while the Pāli has abhivadanti yaññā.) This verse originally appears in the context of Uruvela-Kassapa’s reply 
to Śākyamuni’s question about why he no longer tended the sacred fire. (Uruvela-Kassapa was one of the three Kassapa 
brothers and a former brahmin who had served the god of fire; for details, see Nakamura 1992.)
44 yongs su gdung ba, *paridāha: Cf. BHSD, s.v. paridāha: “feverish longing, ardent desire, substantially = tṛṣṇā.” Here it may 
be considered to signify sexual desire. “Discordant” describes the feeling that arises after this desire has been fulfilled. In his 
commentary on the immediately foregoing sentence, Guṇamati states that it refers to post-coitus.
45 Cause: *hetu; motive: *nidāna; subject: *adhikaraṇa. Cf. (1) kāmahetu, (2) kāmanidānaṃ, and (3) kāmādhikaraṇaṃ in the 
corresponding Pāli text.
46 (1) ’dod pa’i rgyu dang/ (2) ’dod pa’i gzhi/ (3) ’dod pa’i dbang du bya ba dang/ (4) ’dod pa rnams kho na’i rgyus ma dang 
bu dang/ bu dang ma dang/ pha dang bu dang/ bu dang pha dang/ ming po dang sring mo dang/ sring mo dang ming po 
dang/ grogs po dang/ (D172a) grogs por rtsod par byed na/ skye bo dang (P: om skye bo dang) skye bor lta ci smos.
 Āgama Parallels
 MĀ 99 (T1.585a19–20), MN 13, Mahādukkhakkhanddhasutta (I.86.17–23).
47 According to Guṇamati, “‘Mental affliction as desire’ is ‘desire’ because it causes one to desire (*kāmayatīti kāmaḥ). 
Because mental affliction is desire, it is ‘mental affliction as desire’ (＝ Kdh), that is, wish and passion.”
48 ’dun pa, *chanda; ’dod chags, *rāga: According to Guṇamati, “wish” is directed at objects that have not been obtained and 
passion at objects that have been obtained.
49 According to Guṇamati, “Because things are desire, it is things as desire (＝ Kdh), for they are desired.”
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With the object of desire as the subject and (4) with the very objects of desire as the cause” is because of the two 
kinds of things as desire.52
If that is so, by what cause and for what reason [people] quarrel has been shown [by this sūtra passage].
[Sūtra 19]
 “<Monks, with regard to a woman’s form I do not see even a single form to be attached to, to be infatuated 
with, to desire, to love, to delight in, to lust for, to be stupefied by, to be bound by, and to be fettered by. 
People> (1) lust for, (2) become attached to, (3) long for, (4) are bound by, (5) are stupefied by, (6) covet, and 
(7) are infatuated with <a woman’s form>.”53
The above is a sūtra passage.
 (I) Because through passion (*rāga) possession54 arises, (II) because one dwells55 in the arisen [possession], (III) 
because one desires acquisition and enjoyment, (IV) because one repeatedly thinks about that method,56 (V) because 
one does not see the misery,57 (VI) because there arises tenaciousness towards grasping,58 and (VII) because one 
remains repeatedly on account of the mind’s absorption in attending59 on it because of dissatisfaction—[thus the sūtra 
phrases] should be known in sequence.
[Sūtra 20]
“<‘Kātyāyanīputra, what is the cause, what is the reason that kings quarrel with kings, brahmins quarrel with 
brahmins, and householders quarrel with householders?’
50 Mental afflictions as desire: *kleśakāma; things as desire: *vastukāma. According to PTSD, 598a, kilesakāma and 
vatthukāma form a pair. They also appear frequently as twin concepts in Sanskrit texts too (ŚrBh [T30.467b]). “Desire” in 
“mental afflictions as desire” refers to desire per se, while “desire” in “things as desire” refers to objects of desire.
51 According to Guṇamati, they have respectively a wish for an object (*viṣaya) that has not been obtained as the cause and 
passion for an object that has been obtained as the source.
52 According to Guṇamati, they respectively have things as desire for that which has not been obtained as the subject and are 
due to things as desire for that which has been obtained.
53 dge slong dag ngas ni ji ltar skyes pa bud med kyi gzugs la zhen par ’gyur ba dang/ rgyags par ’gyur ba dang/ ’dod par 
’gyur ba dang/ sdug par ’gyur ba dang/ dga’ bar ’gyur ba dang/ chags par ’gyur ba dang/ brgyal bar ’gyur ba dang/ ’ching 
bar ’gyur ba dang/ kun tu (D: du) sbyor bar ’gyur ba lta bu’i gzugs ni gcig (P: cig) kyang ma mthong ste/ skyes pa ni bud 
med kyi gzugs la (1) chags pa dang/ (2) zhen pa dang/ (3) ’chums (P: ’chum) pa dang/ (4) mdud pa (P: par) bor ba dang/ (5) 
brgyal ba dang/ (6) lhag par chags pa dang/ (7) lhag par zhen par ’gyur ba (D: gyur pa).
 Āgama Parallels
 AN 5.55, Mātuputtā (III.68.7-14); no Chinese parallel.
 Related Texts
 Mvy, 2191–2198: (1) rakta, (2) sakta, (3) gṛddha, (4) granthita, (5) mūrcchita, (6) adhyavasita, (7) adhyavasānam āpanna.
  SWTF, s.v. gṛddha: SHT (V) 1152 V2: raktā saktā gṛddhā grathitā mūrcchitā a+.
54 kun nas dkris pa, *paryavasthāna: Another term for mental afflictions, especially active or manifest mental afflictions. Eight 
or ten such mental afflictions are counted, including shamelessness and immodesty. Cf. AKK, V.47.
55 dang du len pa, adhi√vas.
56 de’i thabs: According to Guṇamati, the method for acquiring (the object of one’s desire).
57 nyes dmigs, *ādīnava.
58 yongs su gzung ba la kun tu ’dzin pa: According to Guṇamati, this refers to a woman’s form. All seven phrases in the sūtra 
passage pertain to this.
59 bsten, *√sev.
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‘Brahmin,60> because61 they (1) crave for, (2) covet, (3) adhere to, (4) are obsessed by, (5) and are attached to objects 
of desire <kings quarrel with kings, brahmins quarrel with brahmins, and householders quarrel with householders.’
‘Kātyāyanīputra, what is the cause, what is the reason that renunciants quarrel with renunciants?’
‘Brahmin, because they (1) crave for, (2) covet, (3) adhere to, (4) are obsessed by, (5) and are attached to views 
renunciants quarrel with renunciants.’>”62
The above is a sūtra passage.
[Interpretation I]
It is in sequence (I) manifest activity,63 (II) applying oneself,64 (III) being overwhelmed,65 (IV) not being ashamed of 
it, and (V) delighting66 in it.
[Interpretation II]
Furthermore, it is in sequence the twosome67 of (I) delighting68 in, (II) seizing,69 and (III) wishing not to be separated 
from one’s own object of desire and (IV) delighting in and (V) being attached to another’s object of desire.
 With regard to views70 too, (1) craving for, (2) being attached to, and (3) adhering to views is the same. If the 
views are incompatible, by delighting one’s own view71 (4) one is obsessed by it. If the views are compatible, it 
should be known that by being enamoured72 of that view (5) one is attached [to it].
 Even if the above phrases were spoken as synonyms, there is no fault because they have a purpose,73 as was 
60 According to the Chinese and Pāli parallels, the brahmin’s name was Ārāma daṇḍa. This sūtra is one in which he poses 
questions to (Mahā)Kaccāna.
61 According to Guṇamati, “because” governs phrases (1) – (5).
62 kye kātyā’i (P: katya’i) bu gang gis ni (D: na) rgyal po rnams dang rgyal po rnams su rtsod par byed pa dang/ bram ze 
rnams dang/ bram ze rnams su rtsod par byed pa dang/ khyim bdag rnams dang/ khyim bdag rnams su rtsod par (P40a) byed 
pa’i rgyu ni gang/ rkyen ni gang/ 
 bram ze ’dod pa la (1) ’dod chags dang/ (2) lhag par zhen pa dang/ (3) rnam par bcings pa dang/ (4) yongs su zhen pa dang/ 
(5) kun tu (D: du) ’dod chags kyi rgyus rgyal po rnams dang rgyal po rnams su rtsod par byed/ bram ze rnams dang bram ze 
rnams su rtsod par byed/ khyim bdag rnams dang khyim bdag rnams su rtsod par byed do//
 kye kātyā’i (P: katya’i) bu gang gis ni (P: om ni) rab tu byung ba rnams dang rab tu byung ba rnams su rtsod par byed pa’i 
rgyu ni gang/ rkyen ni gang/
 bram ze lta ba la ’dod chags dang/ lhag par zhen pa dang/ rnam par bzings pa dang/ yongs su zhen pa dang/ kun tu (D: du) 
’dod chags kyi rgyus rab tu byung ba rnams dang rab tu byung ba rnams su rtsod par byed do.
 Āgama Parallels
 SĀ 546 (T2.141b26–c2), AN 2.4.6, Ārāmadaṇḍo (I.66.6(10)–15), as pointed out in Ueno 2012b.
 Related Materials
 Mvy, 2198–2201: (2) adhyavasānam, (3) vinibandhaḥ, (4) parigredhaḥ, (5) saṃrāgaḥ.
  This sūtra is also quoted in the AKUP, where mention is made of “farmers” after “kings” (Honjō 2014: 1022).
63 kun tu spyod pa, *samudācāra.
64 dang du len pa, *adhi√vas.
65 zil gyis gnon pa, *abhibhūta.
66 kun tu dga’ ba, *ā-√nand.
67 The two are (1) – (3) and (4) – (5), which concern oneself and others respectively.
68 mngon par dga’ ba.
69 yongs su bzung ba, *pari-√grah.
70 According to Guṇamati, these are the five (erroneous) views, starting with the view of (the existence of) a real body 
(*satkāya-dṛṣṭi).
71 According to Guṇamati, this means to think about how others might come to hold one’s own view.
72 rjes su chags pa, *anunaya.
73 dgos pa, *prayojana.
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explained previously.74
[Sūtra 21]
 “Monks, in those beings (1) there is no practice related to meaning (*artha-caryā), (2) there is no practice 
related to the teaching (*dharma-caryā), (3) there is no practice related to merit (*puṇya-caryā), (4) there is 
no practice related to goodness (*kuśala-caryā), and (5) there is no practice related to excellence (*kalyāṇa-
caryā).”75
The above is a sūtra passage.
[Interpretation I]
To seek, listen to, ponder, and preach the meaning (*artha) of a sūtra is “(1) practice related to meaning.” To seek the 
teaching,76 listen to, read aloud, chant, and teach [it] is “(2) practice related to the teaching.” To perform meritorious 
deeds regarding77 prosperity (*abhyudaya) by means of those two (i.e., practice related to meaning and practice 
related to the teaching) is “(3) practice related to merit.” To perform invariable action78 is “(4) practice related to 
goodness.” To cultivate the [thirty-seven] factors pertaining to awakening regarding definitive good (*niḥśreyasa)79 
is “(5) practice related to excellence” because there is no stain80 and because there is no change because there is no 
falling back.81
[Interpretation II]
Furthermore, giving is “(3) practice related to merit.” Morality is “(4) practice related to goodness” because one does 
not harm others on account of the meaning of happiness.82 Cultivation83 is “(5) practice related to excellence.”84
74 According to Guṇamati, “previously” refers to: dgos pa dag ni brgyad de/ rnam grangs gsungs pa ni ’dul ba tha dad pa’i 
phyir te/ de’i tshe dang phyi ma’i tshe kha cig la la (P: om la) las khong du chud par bya ba’i phyir dang zhes bya ba de lta 
bu la sogs pa’o//. This passage appears in VyY, I (D31b, P35a; Ueno 2009).
75 dge slong dag sems can de dag la ni (1) don spyod pa med/ (2) chos spyod pa med/ (3) bsod nams spyod pa med/ (4) dge ba 
spyod pa med/ (5) dge legs spyod pa med do.
 Āgama Parallels
 MĀ 160 (T1.682b16–17). The Pāli parallels are AN 7.69 and 70, but there are no identical phrases.
 Related Materials
 SWTF, s.v. kalyāṇacaryā: SHT (VI) 1324 V3; MAV(F), 8g.6,13: sādhv (1) arthacaryā sādhu (2) dharmacaryā sādhu (4) 
kuśalacaryā sādhu (5) kalyāṇacaryeti.
76 chos ’tshol ba, *dharmaparyeṣṭi.
77 I.e., for the purpose of.
78 mi g-yo ba’i las, *āneñjya/āniñjya-karma: According to Guṇamati, “action connected to [the realms of] form and non-form is 
invariable” (gzugs dang gzugs med pa na spyod pa’i las ni mi g-yo baʼo). This tallies with AKK, IV.46ab, according to which 
“a good (śubha) action in the realm of desire is meritorious [action], and above there (i.e., in the realms of form and non-
form) [a good action] is invariable.” Interpretation I takes (3), (4) and (5) to refer to three ascending stages.
79 Prosperity: mngon par mtho ba, Mvy, 5377: *abhyudaya; definitive good: nges par legs pa, Mvy, 1729: *niḥśreyasa... These 
two terms are used as a pair and may be considered to refer to mundane and supramundane states respectively. They also 
appear in the AKBh, 185.16, and according to the Lunji 論記 (196a) they pertain to better birth among humans and gods and 
to the superior path of definitive uncontaminatedness respectively. YBh, 149.8-9: abhyudayamārgo, niḥśreyasamārga 
(T31.310b: 最勝生道, 決定勝道). These two terms also appear in sūtra quotations in VyY, I (Ueno 2013: (5)).
80 According to Guṇamati, this means that it is untainted like gold, and it refers to the state of being uncontaminated (*anāsrava).
81 yongs su nyams pa.
82 According to Guṇamati, “because one upholds the renunciation of killing and so on” (srog gcod pa la sogs pa rnams spong 
ba yang dag par blang ba’i phyir ro//).
83 Giving (dāna), morality (śīla), and cultivation (bhāvanā) are known as the “three items of meritorious action” (AKK, 
IV.112ff.).
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[Sūtra 22]
“<Monks, foolish ordinary people uninstructed [in Buddhism] speak of ‘the ocean, the ocean’. [But] that [is not]85 
the ocean in the noble one’s teaching and discipline. Monks, that is [no more than] (1) a great repository of water, (2) 
a great river of water, (3) a great mass of water, and (4) a great current of water, and, monks, a person’s eye is the 
ocean.>”86
The above is a sūtra passage.
[Interpretation I]
Because the receptacle is large, it is “(1) a great repository of water.” Because water is large from the beginning,87 it 
is “(2) a great river of water.” Because it suddenly flows [together]88 from various rivers (chu klung, *nādī), it is “(3) 
a great mass of water.” Because it does not dry up, it is “(4) a great current of water,” for the water is always staying 
still.89
[Interpretation II]
In an āgama there appears:
 “By (I) the meaning of gathering together a great [amount of] water, (II) the meaning of not arising, (III) the 
meaning of having become one,90 and (IV) the meaning of not being exhausted, it is ‘(1) a great repository of 
water’ and as far as ‘(4) a great current of water’.”
[Sūtra 30]
 “Śroṇa, when any śramaṇas or brahmins, on the basis of form, which is (1) impermanent, <(2) unconstant, (3) 
unreliable, and (4) characterized by change, consider themselves to be superior, consider themselves to be 
equal,91 or consider themselves to be inferior,92 that is because all those śramaṇas and brahmins do not see 
84 According to Guṇamati, “practice related to meaning” and “practice related to the teaching” are the same as before.
85 The sūtra passage quoted by Guṇamati has de rgya mtsho dang (“that is the ocean and”), but I have translated this passage in 
line with SĀ (非聖所説) and SN (neso bhikkhave ariyassa vinaye samuddo). The negative particle ma was presumably 
wrongly inserted in (4) chu’i chu chen po ma yin gyi (“it is not a great current of water”).
86 dge slong dag byis pa so so’i skye bo thos pa dang mi ldan pa dag ni rgya mtsho rgya mtsho (D: om rgya mtsho) zhes tshig 
tu brjod (D: rjod) par byed do// ’phags pa’i chos ’dul ba la ni de rgya mtsho ma yin te (ma yin te; sic. dang)/ dge slong dag 
de ni (1) chu gter chen po dang/ (2) chu’i chu bo chen po dang/ (3) chu’i tshogs chen po dang/ (4) chu’i chu chen po {ma} 
yin gyi/ dge slong dag skyes bu’i mig ni rgya mtsho yin no.
 Cf. Mvy, 4163–4164: chu chen, mahārṇava; chu gter, jalanidhi.
 Āgama Parallels
 SĀ 216 (T2.54b23–24), 217 (T2.54c6–7). SĀ 217 corresponds to the sūtra quoted as Sūtra 77, and in the Pāli parallel the 
subsequent section corresponds to Sūtra 77. SN 35.187.2, 188.2, Samuddo 1, 2 (III.157).
  *The gist of this sūtra is that the six sense objects are known by the six sense organs and that the actions of body, 
speech, and mind whereby one longs for, becomes attached to, and lusts after sense objects are the true “ocean,” presumably 
because the mind, rather than the body, wallows in them.
 Related Materials
 VastSg (T30.811a).
87 ye nas: “from its source”?
88 glo bur du ’bab pa.
89 According to Guṇamati, because there is always water.
90 According to Guṇamati, “because it stays still because rainwater becomes one” (kun nas ’bab pa’i chu gcig tu ’gyur bas gnas 
pa’i phyir ro).
91 VyYT: mi ’dra’o (“are not equal”); SūŚa: khyad par du ’phags so (“are superior”). In the given context the negative particle 
is better omitted, as in Pāli sadiso and Chinese deng 等. See also the following note.
92 VyYT, SūŚa: dman pa ma yin no (“are not inferior”). The negative particle is better omitted, as in Pāli hīno and Chinese lie 劣.
359Journal of International Philosophy, No.4 2015
[things] as they really are. Śroṇa, when [any] śramaṇas or brahmins, [on the basis] that sensation is 
impermanent, that perception is impermanent, that volitional formations are impermanent, and that 
consciousness is impermanent and unconstant, as before.>”93
The above is a sūtra passage.
[Interpretation I]
With from “form, which is (1) impermanent” to “consciousness is impermanent” it teaches that the body94 arises and 
perishes, and with “(2) unconstant” [it teaches] that [the body] perishes in a short period of time. Again, by “(3) 
unreliable” [it teaches] that [the body] perishes at an undetermined time.95 By “(4) is characterized by change” [it 
teaches] that [the body] perishes in a different state, because it goes to an undesirable state.96 By one [phrase] (= (1)) 
it teaches that [the body] possesses two characteristics of the conditioned,97 by two [phrases] (= (2), (3)) [it teaches] 
the particularity of abiding because the [individual] continuum is short and the time [of death] is undetermined. By 
the fourth [phrase it teaches] that that very abiding changes into something else.
[Interpretation II]
Furthermore, by one [phrase] (= (1)) it denies that the body does not perish, and by the second [phrase it denies] that 
it perishes over a long period. By the third [phrase it denies] that it perishes at a determined time. By the fourth 
[phrase it denies] that it perishes without changing.
[Interpretation III]
Furthermore,98 by one [phrase] (= (1)) it teaches [I] the impermanence of perishing in an instant, and by two [phrases 
it teaches] [II] the impermanence of the perishing of the [individual] continuum, [in sequence] because it does not 
remain for a long period in the commonality of the group [of sentient beings]99 and because it may die in an untimely 
93 gro bzhin skyes dge sbyong (D: slong) ngam bram ze gang la la dag gzugs (1) mi rtag pa/ (2) mi brtan pa/ (3) yid brtan du 
mi rung ba/ (4) ’gyur ba’i chos can gyis che ba yin no snyam du rlom par byed/ {mi}  ’dra’o (SūŚa: khyad par du ’phags so) 
snyam du rlom par byed/ dman pa {ma}  yin no snyam du rlom par byed de (P: do)/ gro bzhin skyes dge sbyong (D: slong) 
ngam bram ze de thams cad ni de ltar yang dag pa ji lta ba bzhin du ma mthong ba’i phyir ro// gro bzhin skyes dge sbyong 
ngam bram ze tshor ba mi rtag pa dang/ ’du shes mi rtag pa dang/ ’du byed rnams mi rtag pa dang/ rnam par shes pa mi 
rtag pa dang/ mi brtan pa zhes bya ba snga ma bzhin no.
 Āgama Parallels
 SĀ 30 (T2.6a27–c2), SN 22.49, Soṇa (III.48.12ff.), as pointed out in Ueno 2012b.
  *In the SūŚa the final sentence differs from the text as quoted by Guṇamati; SūŚa: “Like form, it is the same through to 
consciousness.”
 Related Materials
 MPS, 19.6, etc.: (1) anityā bhikṣavaḥ sarvasaṃskārā (2) adhruvā (3) anāśvāsikā (4) vipariṇāmadharmāṇaḥ.
  The Pāli parallel mentions three items—anicca, dukkha, and vipariṇāmadhamma—which include suffering. The 
Chinese parallel has impermanence (無常), change (變易), and unstable form (不安穩色). The MPS tallies the most closely 
with the VyY.
94 Guṇamati mentions “the body characterized by the five aggregates of appropriation” (lus nye bar len pa’i phung po lnga’i 
mtshan nyid ni) and the “(individual) continuum” (rgyun, *saṃtati/saṃtāna).
95 dus ma nges par: This means that the time of death is not known.
96 According to Guṇamati, this refers to ageing.
97 As is noted by Guṇamati, these correspond to arising and perishing among the four marks of conditioned existence (arising, 
abiding, changing, and perishing). (2) and (3) correspond to “abiding” and (4) to “changing.” As regards the four (or three) 
marks of conditioned existence, the Sarvāstivādins maintain that these four marks occur in a single instant, whereas the 
Sautrāntikas explain them in terms of a single life-span (Hirakawa 1966 [1991]; Hayashima 1988). The interpretation given 
here in the VyY does not at least seem to see the four marks in a single instant.
360 Brahmacarya, Paramārtha, and Kāma: Interpretations and Modern Equivalents Based on the Interpretations in Chapter 2 of the Vyākhyāyukti with Annotated Translations of Sūtra Passages 9, 14, 17–22 & 30
manner.100 By the fourth [phrase it teaches] [III] the impermanence of change. The first (= (1)) was taught by the 
selfsame word101 because it is the ultimate.102
In this regard it says:103
“[Interpretation II] It denies that (I) it does not perish, (II) it perishes over a long period, (III) [it perishes] at a 
[determined] time, and (IV) [it perishes] without changing.
[Interpretation III] Three kinds of extinction—(I) instant, (II) life-span, and (III) change—were also taught.”
98 Three kinds of impermanence are explained here. Impermanence is treated in detail in Hayashima 1998. According to 
Hayashima, the term vipariṇāmānityatā appears in the ŚrBh, 485.6–7 in the sense of “change as impermanence,” but the 
terms “impermanence in an instant” and “impermanence of the continuum” do not appear in the ŚrBh. In the Xianyang lun 
顯揚論 these latter two kinds of impermanence are said to be “omnipresent” (T31.548a: 遍一切處), with “impermanence in 
an instant” in particular said to be “all-pervading” (548c: 遍行一切), and importance is attached to them for their 
connections with the cittamātratā theory. In the cittamātratā theory, however, impermanence is classified into six or eight 
kinds, and there is no grouping of three kinds of impermanence such as is found here.
99 ris mthun pa, *nikāyasabhāga: common characteristics of a species. See Saitō et al. 2014.
100 dus ma yin par ’chi, *akāla-mṛtyu/maraṇa: to die prematurely.
101 *svaśabdena: i.e., “impermanence of perishing in an instant” is meant by the word “(1) impermanent.”
102 don dam pa pa: According to Guṇamati, this is because there is no impermanence of the continuum or impermanence of 
change outside impermanence in an instant.
103 These verses summarize Interpretations II and III.
